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COMES NOW the Appellant, George 1. Besaw Jr., by and through his attorney of record, 





THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN IT'S FAILURE TO SUPPRESS THE 
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. 
The State does not deny that there has never been a Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 702 
hearing on field sobriety testing in the State ofldaho. The State's brief notes: "Idaho law provides 
that a properly trained police officer may testifY regarding field sobriety tests, including the 
horizontal gaze nystagnus test." State's Brief at p. 13. The State does not tell the Court what "a 
properly trained police officer" might be. The State does not tell the Court how a police officer 
might be "properly trained" to testifY regarding field sobriety tests including the horizontal gaze 
nystagnus test. The State does not tell the Court what information the police officer must be 
trained on so he can testify about field sobriety tests including the horizontal gaze nystagnus test. 
After the quote noted above, the State lists a string cite of cases from the State ofIdahol. 
The State does not note any cases from outside the State of Idaho that have been written since 
State v. Garrett, 119 Id. 878, 811 P .3d 488 (1990) was decided. The Garrett court, in it's 
plurality decision, used the Frye standard which is no longer used in the State ofIdaho. See State 
v. Faught, 127 Id. 873,876,908 P.2d 556 (1995). See also Judge Lansing dissenting opinion in 
The years the cases were decided are as follows: 1995, 1992, 1991, 1997,2009,1998 and 1979. 
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State v. Mazzuca, 132 Id. 868, 979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The State's position is as outdated as State v. Garrett, supra, if the court compares both 
to the case law that has developed regarding field sobriety testing since 1991. In Garrett, the 
Court stated its reason for looking at cases outside Idaho: 
At p. 880. 
"This court has not heretofore been presented with having to decide whether 
HGN tests are reliable enough for their results to be admissible at trial. 
However, other state courts have considered this question, and we may 
properly look to their opinions for guidance. Because the reliability of a 
test based on a scientifically tested phenomenon should not vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we examine what other jurisdictions have 
done when HGN test results are offered as evidence in DUI cases." 
(emphasis added) 
Idaho would be outside the norm ifit did not require use of the NHTSA standards for field 
sobriety tests. In the Garrett case, the Court specifically notes that it used State v. Superior Court, 
718 P.2d 171 (Arizona 1986) to support it's decision for Idaho. The Arizona Supreme Court 
conducted an "in-depth" analysis of HGN testing. Garrett at p. 881. Dr. Marcelline Burns, a 
research psychologist, was called to testifY in Arizona as was a National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) consultant on field sobriety tests. The Garrett Court also noted that the 
State in Arizona submitted articles from scientific publications and research reports done on 
behalf of the NHTSA A copy of this Arizona case is attached and marked Exhibit "A" for the 
benefit of the Court. The Court, in reviewing the Arizona case, will note that the NHTSA 
standards were quite pronounced in the information provided to the Arizona Court. 
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The Arizona Court stated as follows: 
At p. 881. 
"The test's recognized margin of error provides problems as to criminal 
convictions which require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
circumstances under which the test is administered at roadside mav affect the 
reliability of the tests results. Nvstagnus may be caused by conditions other 
than alcohol intoxication." (emphasis added) 
The Idaho Supreme Court determined the admissibility of scientific field sobriety tests like 
the HGN should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Mr Besaw, in his first brief, pointed 
out a substantial number of state decisions in which the NHTSA standards were the foundation 
for properly training police officers. Without use of these national standards, a police officer's 
testimony really has little value. 
In Garrett, supra, the Court went on to discuss the qualifications of the officer who 
testified about the administration of the HGN. In Besaw, the State provided next to nothing with 
regard to Trooper Talbot's qualifications. In Garrett, the officer was attached to the select traffic 
enforcement team. He was also an instructor in the use of the field sobriety tests. He attended 
seminars conducted by Dr. Marcelline Burns of the Southern California Research Institute. The 
Garrett Court notes: 
At pp. 883. 
"Dr. Burns worked with the NHTSA to develop reliable field sobriety tests, 
and was one of the designers of the test testifYing before the Arizona trial 
court." 
The State cites the Court to State v. Stevens, 126 Id. 822 (1995). If the Court reads that 
decision, it will see that the evidence in question involve the officer testifYing about the "National 
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Traffic Safety Institute" or most probably the NHTSA. In State v. Stevens, supra, the officer and 
the State were relying on field sobriety tests developed by the NHTSA. In State v. Gleason, 123 
Id. 62 (1992), the Supreme Court calls into question the analysis of State v. Garrett. The Gleason 
Court stated, "It is authoritative on the issue ofthe scientific reliability of the HGN test evidence, 
however it is not authority for the appropriate test against which scientific reliability is to be 
measured." At p. 65. The Gleason Court also noted, "This court reaffirms that the appropriate 
test for measuring the scientific reliability of evidence is IRE 702." At p. 65. 
In Gleason, supra, Deputy Wolfinger was allowed to testifY about how he administered 
the test and about his opinion based on his observations in administering the test. He was allowed 
to state that nystagnus or eye jerking prior to 45 degrees is a strong indicator that the driver is 
under the influence of alcohol. Gleason at p. 64. The 45 degrees is a standard set by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 
The Court may want to inquire of the State: Where exactly did the field sobriety test used 
by Trooper Talbot on Mr. Besaw during that cold, rainy January night come from; where did the 
use of the stimulus to go across the eyes come from; where did walk heel to toe nine steps and 
turn come from; where did the standing on one leg for thirty second come from? The NHTSA 
manual requires compliance with its standards to have valid field sobriety test results as noted in 
the cases cited in the initial brief filed by Mr. Besaw. 
The Court in State v. Garrett, supra, also cited to a California decision, People v. Ojeda, 
225 Ca. App. 3d 404,275 Ca. Rep. 472, 474 (1990). The decision by this California Court of 
Appeals actually holds as follows: 
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At p. 409. 
"We do not hold that HGN is a reliable indicator of alcohol intoxication, that 
the HGN test meets Kelly/Frye standards, or that nonscientists are qualified 
to correlate HGN with a particular level of blood alcohol. Nor do we decide 
the extent of personal experience with a field sobriety test an officer must 
have in order to use it to form an opinion on intoxication. We hold only that 
an officer with sufficient experience may testify, based on his or her own 
experience with the relationship between HGN and alcohol intoxication, to 
an opinion that a subject was or was not under the influence." 
Part of the Besaw probable cause affidavit notes "field sobriety tests-meets decision 
points". Gaze nystagnus yes, walk and turn yes, one leg stand yes. R. at p. 10. The alcohol 
influence report specifically notes certain things that have to be done or at least have to be 
checked offbythe officer regarding the HGN, vertical nystagnus, walk and turn and one leg stand. 
There is even a chart that notes walk and turn and one leg stand. R. at p. 15. Where do these 
decision points or factors that are set out in the alcohol influence report come from? They come 
from the NHTSA standards for field sobriety testing. However, the NHTSA manual and its 
standards were not important to the magistrate or District Court. 
At the time of the motion hearing, the arresting officer testified that his training regarding 
field sobriety test involved the NHTSA manual. Motion Hearing T. at p. 24. He testified that 
there were three standardized tests and that the manual required a specific standardized testing 
procedure to be followed and if not, the test weren't valid. Motion Hearing T. at p. 25,11. 4-8. 
The trooper also testified about the HGN and the requirements that are set out in the manual. 
Motion Hearing T. at p. 30. The trooper was also questioned about the NHTSA manual regarding 
HGN. He was asked about the section that states, "If the eyes do not track together or if the pupils 
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are noticeably unequal in size, the chance of medical disorders or other injury causing the 
nystagnus is present." He agreed that this was what he was trained. He specifically noted in his 
police report that Mr. Besaw's pupils were unequal in size at the time ofHGN testings. Motion 
Hearing T. at pp. 132-133. 
Mr. Besaw is not arguing that law enforcement needs some kind of medical expertise to 
associate nystagnus with being under the influence. Mr. Besaw has simply cited case law from 
Idaho and across the country that notes the use of IRE 702 and how the rule should be applied 
to Mr. Besaw's case. 
The State argues, "He further contends that this Court should adopt the NSTSA standards 
for performing field sohriety tests as a minimum standard for admission of evidence ofthe results 
of those tests." State's Briefat p. 14. The State has finally gotten something right in it's analysis 
ofMr. Besaw's argument. Without adopting the NHTSA standards, which are the basis for the 
HGN, walk and turn and one leg stand, how in the world would the Court ever be able to gage 
whether an officer's testimony has any relevance to a DUI? What happens if one officer holds 
his stimulus two inches away from the person's face and the next officer holds his stimulus twenty 
inches away from the person's face for the HGN? There has to be some set of standards for any 
of the field sobriety tests to make any sense considering that they are based on studies done by the 
NHTSA and Dr. Marcelline Burns. 
Without these NHTSA standards, there are no HGN, walk and turn or one leg stand. See 
State vs. Witte~ 836 P.2d 110 (Kansas 1992), United States vs. Horn, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D. Md. 
2002), State v. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Hawaii App. 1999) and State vs. 0 'Key, 899 P.2d 687 (Oregon 
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1995), People v.lvfcKown, 924 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. 2010) and White v. Miller, 724 S.E.2d 768 (W.Va. 
2012). 
The State continues on by arguing "adopting Besaw's suggested legal tests would 
necessarily involve overturning the contrary precedent cited above." State's Brief at p. 14. The 
adoption of the NHTSA standards for field sobriety testing does not overturn precedent, it simply 
brings up-to-date the requirements for field sobriety testings based on all the case law that has 
developed since 1991. 
The State, in it's brief, noted, " ... Besaw has failed to show that the magistrate or district 
court erred by following well established precedent in ruling that the officer could testify 
regarding field sobriety test he conducted." State's Brief at pp. 14-15. What is the well 
established precedent that the district court and magistrate court followed? The trial court simply 
cited to State v. Ferreira, 133 rd. 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999), to support his decision, but 
Ferreira had nothing to do with the issues before the magistrate. The District Court simply 
indicated that the standards for proper field sobriety testings were not relevant and unnecessary. 
R. at p. 648, FN 4. The field sobriety test should have been suppressed because they did not 
follow the standard of the NHTSA manual and the results were explained by other factors than 
alcohol. 
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2. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY NOT SUPPRESSING THE 
BREATH TEST 
A. 
THE PERFOR.MANCE VERIFICATION OF THE LIFELOC FC20 WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENT AS IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
SOP 
The ISP Trooper should have used the 0.20 solution for the preformation verification after 
Mr. Besaw's breath test. The State in it's briefing cites only to certain subsections of the 
November 1, 2010, SOP to support its position, but as the Court is aware, the SOP must be read 
as a whole to get the full understanding of the 0.20 solution performance verification 
requirements. In this record, the e-mails that were generated by the ISPFS discuss the science of 
linearity in breath testing. These e-mails also discuss the need for the 0.20 solution with regard 
to 0.20 blows. Jeremy Johnston, the head of the breath testing in the State ofIdaho wrote: 
R. at p. 42. 
"As for the 0.20 requirement, I'm suggesting not dropping it altogether, I 
am just suggesting putting in some wiggle room language so that in the 
event that the 0.20 is not run in a calendar month, the prosecution only 
loses the enhanced penalty charge that the 0.20 checks supports and not 
the entire DUI charge. DUI's deals with thresholds and for regular DUI, 
the threshold is 0.08. It (sic) the proper cal checks are in place to support 
that charge, then the charge should be valid. The person that blows a 
0.14/0.15 should not get off on a technicality because the BTS failed to run 
a cal check to support a charge that is not pending for that case. After all, 
a year and a half ago, the 0.20 check wasn't even required and the 
prosecution had no problems at all until they got above the 0.20 threshold 
for the enhanced penalty. That was the reasoning behind instituting the 
0.20 check in the first place. Cases are currently being tossed because 
of this. It seems like it is a disservice to the state of Idaho to continue to 
keep that loophole open." (emphasis added) 
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Please note Mr. Johnston's use of the term "wiggle room language" in how he looks at 
developing the SOP. David Laycock participated in the discussion regarding the 0.20 solution. 
He wrote: 
R. at p. 43. 
"Why do we want to go backwards? I didn't say there was not testing to 
show it looses alcohol just sitting there; I don't know. What happens if the 
simulator is on 2417 but no tests are run? I don't think this is the time 
to cut back on quality standards. 
JJ, you mentioned the cases that were getting dismissed because agencies 
weren't running the 0.20. They could easily cure the problem simply by 
spending 30 minutes per month in complying with the SOP. They could 
even save the 0.20 and use it the next month, maybe two. Face it, most 
agencies would probably be happy if the SOP were trimmed down to 
2 or 3 pages total." 
Isn't this last sentence about a two or three page SOP telling, and this coming from one 
of the employees of the ISPFS? For the State, less is more. For the drivers ofIdaho, less is not 
more. Less violates scientific principles and due process. Please note that David Laycock cites 
to Dubowski as a resource for breath testing in the State ofIdaho. R. at p. 43. In addition, the 
Court should note that there are cases from other parts of the country that deal with linearity in 
breath testing at different intoxication levels. See State v. Holland, 27 A.3d. 1212 (App. Div. N.J. 
2011 ). 
Jeremy Johnston states in an e-mail dated February 26, 2008: 
"Afterall (sic), we only really care about the instruments linearity, at the 
upper levels, when we had a case with results at or above the upper 0.20 
level. In which case, they didn't run the 0.20 check, the linearity isn't 
really in question because they would be using the 0.08 check and 
threshold for prosecution. Personally, I think that 'in support of the 
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R. at p. 45. 
excessive consumption charge' actually covers both bases without being 
overly analytical in the SOP. Do we care if the instrument is linear at the 
0.20 if the breath sample is below the 0.20 level? As long as it is above 
the .08, our bases are covered. 
P.S. I think that is where we are getting lost in the translation. It is good 
scientific practice to check linearity because that lends credence to the 
accuracy of the numbers that the instrument generates. What is 
different with the BTS program is that we only need to know the accuracy 
ofthe numbers at the legally relevant thresholds. The numbers in between 
are irrelevant as long as they can be proven to be above the threshold that 
is being charged (excessive or not)." 
Darren Jewkes states on February 25, 2008 the following: 
R. at p. 45. 
"In addition to running a 0.20 check for excessive consumption, it should 
also be run to demonstrate the linearity of the instrument. If we stated as 
policy that the 0.20 checks only support excessive consumption than 
agencies are more likely to skip this check on a regular basis." 
Jeremy Johnston on February 25, 2008, states: 
R. at p. 46. 
"It absolutely would because the 'must' would be replaced with a 
'should' in the case of an enhanced penalty situation. We could even 
change it to read that the 0.20 should be run once and (sic) month, and 
must be run to support an enhanced penalty charge. Then we have the 
best of both worlds. No enhanced charge without the 0.20, but if they 
don't run it, they can still charge regular DDI." (emphasis added) 
A few minute before the above noted e-mail, Jeremy Johnston writes: 
"Correct, I'm just trying to close a loophole with the 0.20 and the 'must' 
language that is being used by defense in the ALS to say that the 
instrument that was used wasn't properly usable because the 0.20 check 
wasn't performed according to the SOP." 
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R. at p. 46. 
The SOP is being changed based on what is happening with ALS hearings and DUI cases, 
not what is scientifically acceptable. The State's brief agrees. State's Brief at p. 6. These e-mails 
are simply discussions about what makes things easier to prosecute DUIs and get ALS 
suspensions upheld. R. at p. 47. 
The State's brief fails to set out the complete SOP language regarding performance 
verification of breath testing instruments. The following is found in the SOP that took effect on 
November 1, 2010: 
"5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instrument 
Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho 
State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is 
functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed using a wet bath simulator 
performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. 
The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range of the solutions used 
for the verification and includes the acceptable values may be different from those show 
on the bottle label. 
5.1 Aleo-Sensor and Lifeloc fc20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument 
Performance Verification 
5.1.1 The Aleo-Senso and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing 
instrument performance verification is run using approximately 
0.08 and/or 0.20 performance verification solutions provided by 
and/or approved by ISPFS. 
5.1.2 The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance 
verification solutions consist of two samples. 
5.1.3 A performance verification of the Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc 
FC20 instruments using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance 
verification solution must be performed within 24 hours, 
before or after an evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary 
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use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered by a single 
performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on 
the use of the 0.20 solution in this capacity. 
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be 
replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 
verifications or every calendar month, whichever come 
first. 
5.1.4 A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged 
once per calendar month and replaced with fresh solution 
approximately every 25 verifications or until it reaches its 
expiration date, whichever comes first. 
NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was 
implemented for the sole purpose of supporting the 
instruments's results for an 18-8004C charge. Failure to 
timely perform a 0.20 performance verification will not 
invalidate tests performed that yield results at other 
levels or in charges other than 18-8004C. 
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the 
requirement for performance verification within 24 
hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level. 
The 0.20 performance verification solution should not 
be used routinely for this purpose." (emphasis added) 
Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. 
The State in it's briefing does not explain why ISPFS placed the word "approximately" 
in 5.1.1 and why in 5.1.1 there is the phrase "and/or". This language is not consistent with 5.1.3 
where the word "or" is used in reference to the 0.08 and 0.20 solution. The SOP does not state 
that a 0.08 performance verification within 24 hours satisfies the requirement for an 
excessive breath test. This point is consistent with the e-mails noted above. The SOP 
specifically indicates that a 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for 
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performance verification within 24 hours at any evidentiary test level. SOP 5.1.4.1. The 
highlighted language above must mean something. The State wants to read something into the 
SOP which is simply not there. The reason that ISPFS uses a 0.08 and a 0.20 solution is for the 
benefit oflinearity. Linearity is for the benefit of testing an unknown sample (the driver's breath) 
against a known sample which is the performance verification solution. Section 5.1.4 is just an 
additional provision for a monthly 0.20 solution calibration and has nothing to do with the actual 
breath sample testing with a driver. 
Henry's Law, which is the scientific law that these breath testing machines are based on 
supports Mr. Besaw's argument regarding breath testing in this particular circumstance. Henry's 
Law describes the mechanism of exchange in the lungs which is influenced by physiological 
factors. Henry's Law directly explains the volume of alcohol in the simulator's vapor. Henry's 
Law states that in an enclosed system, at any given temperature, the concentration of a volatile 
substance in the air above a fluid is proportional to the concentration of the volatile substance in 
the fluid. In this circumstance, Mr. Besaw's breath sample is unknown while the liquid solution 
is known and therefore the language and meaning of the SOP supports Mr. Besaw's argument. 
Why exactly would the ISPFS note anything about performance verifications using a 0.20 
within 24 hours if in fact it never had to be used with excessive breath samples? Why make any 
reference to 0.20 at all for the 24 hour performance verification? Why not simply say a 0.08 
solution applies in all circumstances. The State's position flies in the face of the idea oflinearity 
and the whole reason for multiple solutions levels (i.e. 0.04; 0.08; 0.20) used in performance 
verification. State's Motion Hearing Exhibit 12. 
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Just the words themselves "performance verification" support Mr. Besaw's position. 
When there is a solution change at the beginning or end of the month, there is no "verification" 
to be made because there is no breath sample to be tested. There is a calibration of the machine 
to make sure that it registers correctly a 0.08 and 0.20 but there is no "performance" being 
verified. If in fact the performance verification using a 0.20 solution was not required for 
excessive tests, why put extra language in the SOP that just causes confusion? If nothing else, 
this SOP could be considered vague which does not meet the "standard" requirements ofLC. § 
18-8004(4). 
Mr. Besaw has met his burden with regard to the failure of the operator to do a 
performance verification within 24 hours using the 0.20 solution with breath samples that were 
in excess of 0.20. The officer used a 0.08 solution for an excessive breath test. 
B. 
THE 15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SOP 
The video is Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 7, hereinafter known as Exhibit 7. At 
02:31:01 on Exhibit 7, Mr. Besaw was specifically noted as being arrested by the ISP officer. The 
start of the ALS advisory was at 02:37: 15 and it ended at 02:40: 10 based on the audio/video that 
is part of this record as Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. Mr. Besaw inquires at 02:40:13 
about his Class A driver's license and the trooper provided misinformation at 02:40: 16 regarding 
this issue. Motion Hearing T. at p. 91, 11 6-25. 
There is boilerplate language on the probable affidavit that states as follows: "Defendant 
was tested for alcohol concentrations, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The testes) 
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was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 and 18-8004(4) Idaho Code and the 
standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement." (emphasis added) 
R. at p. 10. There is no longer a Department of Law Enforcement so this boilerplate language is 
not helpful in the analysis of whether the arresting officer complied with the requirements ofI.C. 
§ 18-8002A, I.C. § 18-8004(4) and the standards and methods ofISPFS. 
In Exhibit 7, the trooper did not bother to turn on the video for the backseat until after Mr. 
Besaw's breath test was completed. This is his common practice not to video record the breath 
test. 
The magistrate and the District Court simply disregarded all ofthe distracting contacts that 
were made and the common sense that should be applied here. If a trooper is talking to other law 
enforcement officers, passengers or people that arrive later, his focus and senses are going to be 
on those individuals and not on someone who is sitting below his eyesight, handcuffed sitting 
inside the police car in the backseat. This is not a circumstance in which Mr. Besaw's feet were 
outside the vehicle and he was facing towards the outside of the car. According to the trooper, 
he was seated in the vehicle with his feet forward. Motion Hearing T. at p. 92, 11 14-18. 
Also note, Mr Besaw's three samples (.219, insufficient, .201) are at the outer limit of the 
0.02 collation factor. SOP § 6.2.2.2. In addition, the Court can note the 0.08 performance 
verification checks that were noted on the log for January of2011. Defendant's Motion Hearing 
Exhibit 4. Mr. Besaw's 0.08 performance verification noted a .073/.073. The one done prior to 
that on January 6, 2011, noted a .072/.073 for solution lot #10802. For the simulator solution lot 
#10802, the State developed a Certificate of Approval setting the target range for the 0.08 
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solution. The target range for solution lot #10802 is ".072 to .088 grams of ethyl alcoholl21 0 
liters of vapor". Attached to this Brief as Exhibit B is the State's Certificate of Approval. The 
performance verification checks regarding this solution are at the lowest end of the range. The 
check done with the 0.08 solution on January 4, 2011, shows a .074/.075 solution test. 
Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. The solution results were not outside the range, but there 
is a question as to the viability of this particular solution lot. Combine this solution lot problem 
with the range ofMr. Besaw's breath samples, .219, insufficient, and .201 and the Court can 
suspect that the trooper failed to comply with the SOP §§ 6.1.4,6.1.4.1. and 6.1.4.3 2• The Court 
has to determine that under the circumstances something was missed by the trooper because of 
his distractions with the other police officers, the passenger, and the wife of the passenger who 
arrived on the scene prior to breath testing being completed. The trooper could have video taped 
Mr. Besaw in the backseat during the blow sequence, but he choose not to. The trooper could 
have gone to the Nez Perce County jail to have the breath test done in an enclosed environment; 
he choose not to. 
2 
The SOP states: 
"6.1.4 During the monitoring period, the Operator must be alert for any event that might influence 
the accuracy of the breath alcohol test. 
6.1.4.1 The Operator must be aware of the possible presence of mouth alcohol as indicated by the testing 
instrument. If mouth alcohol is suspected or indicated, the Operator should being another 15-
minute waiting period before repeating the testing sequence. 
6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the 15 minute monitoring period, the officer 
should look at results of the duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential alcohol 
contamination. For clarification see section 6.2.2.2." 
Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. 
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Mr. Besaw does not have the burden to come forward and prove anything about burping, 
belching, or the like. He simply has to show that the observation period was not complied with. 
The Court knows he was eating a hamburger shortly before breath testing was started, and he was 
drinking alcohol. Hamburgers and alcohol lead to gas in the stomach; this is just common sense. 
Once again, there does not need to be a Homer Simpson type belch for there to be burping and 
the like in this sort of circumstance. 
The Court should find that there was not a proper observation period. With this Court's 
decision, the Court can instruct these officers to video the blow sequence when they have the 
capability and to take the drivers to an enclosed environment for the benefit of the driver and the 
observing officer. The Court can send a message to arresting officers who decide to do breath 
testing out in the field. The trooper in this case could have called for Lewiston Police Department 
back up since they did not want to leave him alone. Back up Lewiston Police could have fended 
off passengers, wives of passengers and any other distraction. The Court should find that there 
was not a proper observation period and Mr. Besaw's breath test should have been suppressed. 
3. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO FIND A LACK OF STANDARDS 
IN BREATH TESTING AS REQUIRED BY IDAHO CODE § 18-8004(4) 
The State calls the argument made from Appellate's Brief pp. 31-40 a "diatribe" but does 
acknowledge that the SOPs were changed because trial courts were not giving the State the 
APPELLANT'S REPL Y BRIEF 17 
decisions that they wanted. State's Brief at p. 6, FN 13 . The State does not address section 3 of 
Mr. Besaw's first brief other than calling it a "diatribe." However, the Court should consider that 
ISPFS has not complied with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4). Idaho Code Section 18-
8002A(7)( d) specifically notes as grounds for vacating a license suspension: "The tests for alcohol 
concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances administered at the direction of the peace 
officer were not conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4) Idaho 
Code ... ". 
The State did not deny in it's responding brief that the SOP and "breath testing standards" 
were changed as a result of the reasons set out in the emails that were made part of this record. 
R. at pp. 29-141. Emails were provided by the Idaho State police in response to a Freedom of 
Information Request regarding why the changes were made to the SOP. R. at pp. 70, 198,229-
230. 
The State does not address Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378, 
223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2009). Judge Lansing specifically indicated in her dissent that if the ISP 
breath standards were not mandatory, then they could not be any sort of standard at all. In 
addition, the State fails to address the holding in State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. 
App. 1998) and its analysis ofIdaho Code Section 18-8004(4). 
"Because Besaw does not link his diatribe about the amendments to the standard operating procedures 
to any relevant legal standards (Appellant's briefpp. 31-40), the state will respond only by noting that 
altering the procedures was a perfectly legitimate exercise where trial courts had given those procedures 
unexpected interpretations or where reliable BAC testing was being suppressed due to minor oversights 
that did not actually effect the reliability of the testing." 
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The State's basic position is that ISP can set anything as a standard, and the courts and 
drivers in the State have to accept this position. The State's position is that ISP could issue a 
single page, one sentence standard saying that "Whatever ISPFS says goes. Trust us, we're the 
police." End of standard. 
The August 20,2010, SOP's Scope Section states: "Following all the recommendations 
of this external procedure will establish the scientific validity and set the unquestioned 
foundational admissibility of the breath alcohol test." (emphasis added) See R. at p. 563. ISPFS 
decided that what it writes would be "unquestioned" despite what all the case law holds regarding 
what a driver can challenge. Please note all the deletions that occurred to the SOP on August 27, 
201 O,just a scant seven days after the new SOP was put into effect4 . Defendant's Motion Hearing 
Exhibit 3 at p. 50f21. 
The November 1, 2010, SOP under "Scope" sets out: "Following all the 
recommendations ofthis external procedure will establish the scientific validity of the breath 
alcohol test. Failure to meet all the recommendations within this procedure does not disqualifY 
the breath test." (emphasis added) Defendant's Exhibit 3 at p. 7 of21. The ISPFS has determined 
that the SOP is just a "recommendation" that can be explained away by some BTS. The State 
does not explain why there was any scientific need for changes to the SOP and the long standing 
use ofBTS manuals as standards. The State does not cite to any case law in it's responsive brief 
4 
The SOP states: "Deletions and/or additions to section 2,4.3.3,4.4.1,4.4.3,4.4.5,4.6.1.1,5.1.2, 
5.1.4,5.1.4.1,5.1.5,5.2.4,5.2.5,6,6.2.1,6.2.3,6.2.4,7, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.2.2, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.1.5, 
8." Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, at p. 50f21. 
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regarding this issue. 
In Masterson v. Idaho Department o/Transportation,. 150 Idaho 126,244 P.3d 625 (Ct. 
App. 2010), the Court looked at the Intoxilyzer 5000 and 5000EN manuals and noted the internal 
parts and technology utilized by the two instruments were different. The Court used the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 and 5000EN manuals as a part of it's analysis of standards while noting the 
inconsistencies between the SOP and the manuals. 
In Hubbard v. Department o/Transportation, 152 Id. 879,276 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2012), 
the Court quoted Gibbar v. State o/Idaho, Department o/Transportation, 143 Id. 937,155 P.3d 
1176, (Ct. App. 2006): 
At p. 755. 
"In Gibbar, we interpreted Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7)( c) and (d) 'as 
permitting (administrative license suspension) petitioners to challenge the 
results of their BAC tests by proving that the testing equipment was 
inaccurate or was not functioning properly because the State has adopted 
procedures that do not ensure accuracy and property functioning.' Gibbar, 
143 Id. at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186." 
The Court went on to note that in State v. Hartwig, 112 Id. 370, 732 P.2d 339 (Ct. App. 
1987), the reliability and performance of the machine is still subject to challenge. Prior to August 
20,2010, breath testing standards included the BTS Manual and SOP. The BTS manual had 
different sections that dealt with the programming and functioning of the machine, the training 
of the operators in the maintenance and the operation of breath testing devices. 
The SOP Subsection 6.2 dated August 20,2010, states: 
"A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples 
taken during the testing sequence and proceeded by air blanks. The 
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duplicate breath samples should be approximately two minutes apart to 
allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol contamination." 
(emphasis original) 
Now examined the SOP's 6.2 dated November 1,2010, which states: 
"A complete breath test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken 
during the testing sequence and proceeded by air blanks. The duplicate 
breath samples should be approximately two minutes apart, or more, for 
the ASIII and the CS20 to allow for the dissipation of potential mouth 
alcohol contamination. " (emphasis original) 
There is a difference with a distinction between these two SOPs and the language noted. 
The e-mail generated by Eric Moody to Mr Gammette on September 2, 2010, notes that during 
oral argument, two attorneys argued the two minute separation between two breath test results 
(SOP 6.2) do not occur with the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. R. at p. 33. Mr. Moody follows up and 
notes that the Intoxilyzer 5000EN does not have this two minute wait period but the Alcosensor 
III and the Lifeloc FC 20 do. R. at p. 33. He inquiries as to whether this SOP 6.2 only deals with 
the Alcosensor III and the Lifeloc FC 20 but not the Intoxilyzer 5000. 
As of August 20,2010, there would not have been one Intoxilyzer 5000 or one Intoxilyzer 
5000EN in the State ofIdaho that complied with the two minute wait period because the machines 
are not programmed for the two minute wait. 
In November of 2010, ISPFS added the language regarding the Alcosensor III and the 
Lifeloc FC 20 to Section 6.2 because that is the way these machines are programmed. These 
machines are programmed for the two minute wait because that is what the international and 
national standards are for breath testing. The International Organization of Legal Metrology 
(OIML) is a worldwide, intergovernmental organization whose primary aim is to harmonize 
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regulation and metrological controls applied by national metrological serVIces or related 
organizations of its member states such as the United States of America. The United States 
organization is the National Safety Council on alcohol and other drugs. Both organizations 
endorse a minimum of two samples taken not less than two or more than ten minutes apart. This 
standard is cited by Dubowski on page 310 of his article, K.M. Dubowski, "Quality Assurance 
in Breath Alcohol Analysis." Journal of Analytical Toxicology, Volume 18: pp. 306-311 (1994). 
The State's brief does not describe scientific standards are or how a scientific standard can 
be discretionary. Judge Lansing did not seem to think standards could be discretionary in her 
dissent in Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 rd. 378, 223 P.3d, 761 (Ct. App. 
2009). The State does not explain exactly how the standard regarding the 15 minute observation 
period went from a mandatary monitoring period to a discretionary monitoring period, from 
"must" to "should". 
The State also does not cite to In Re Schroeder, 147 Id. 476, 210 P.3d 584 (Ct. App. 
2009). This is the case that probably started ISP's journey to it's current SOP. The Court in In 
Re Schroeder specifically noted that the SOP and the Intoxilyzer 5000 manual were in conflict 
with respect to the circumstances in which the monitoring period must be restarted. The Court 
indicated that Intoxilyzer 5000 manual governed because it was more specific: 
At p. 480. 
"Here, the SOP is more general, for it applies to various breath testing 
devices approved by the ISP, whereas the Intoxilyzer 5000 manual is 
written exclusively for that instrument and is therefore less likely to have 
been written in a way that might sacrifice specific detail for broad 
app licabili ty." 
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One of the e-mail generated by Matthew Gammette to chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors, breath 
testing specialists and breath instrument operators specifically noted: 
R. at p. 31. 
"The Idaho Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) contains the method to 
follow in general. This manual has been revised and updated. 
The 'training manuals' have been replaced by 'reference manuals.' Each 
instrument series has a reference manual. We found that in a number of 
cases the training manual and the SOP had conflicting information 
and the courts were deciding which manual to use for interpretation. 
In the revised manuals we have made it very clear that the SOP is the 
document that should be referenced and the reference manuals are really 
for the BTS or operator reference when working with the instrument 
menus. We have tried to take out any conflicting wording. If we have 
missed something, please let us know. The BTS and operators should be 
very familiar with the SOP." (bold emphasis added) (underlining original) 
Because of the Schroeder case, ISPFS has dumbed down the standards to something that 
is not based on "specific detail" and are just recommendations. There is no indication that there 
was any scientific peer review of these new SOPs. The SOP does not meet the requirements of 
the legislative history Judge Lansing noted in State v. Turbyfill, 2012 WL 4465773, FN 2. 
ISPFS has violated the mandate from the legislature. ISPFS has simply made the breath 
testing system so pliable that there are no standards that ISPFS cannot over come by sending 
Jeremy Johnston or some breath testing specialist into to testifY. Why exactly is Mr. Gammette 
asking chiefs of police, sheriffs, and prosecutors for input in developing "scientific standards" for 
breath testing in the State ofIdaho? The State in it's responding brief does not answer why these 
non-scientists were asked about setting scientific standards in the new SOP. 
It does not take a scientist to figure out that discretionary language and "wiggle" words 
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and vagueness do not amount to scientific standards that should be relied on by the courts. The 
Court can also note another e-mail sent from Matthew Gammette to chiefs of police, prosecutors 
and other "stakeholders" in which he notes that on August 27, 2010, ISPFS published a revision 
1 of the Idaho Breath Testing SOP. He notes the release of revision 0 gave ISPFS the opportunity 
to hear from prosecutors, etc., regarding the SOP. He thanks them for their comments and notes 
that ISPFS is doing some "legal research" regarding sections of the SOP. R. at p. 32. Why 
exactly are scientific standards being developed based on legal research? The legislature passed 
I.C. § 18-8004(4) requiring valid scientific methods of breath testing. ISPFS has made rules that 
weaken the breath testing standards so much that basically if the police get a result, it is 
admissible. Therefore, ISPFS has taken this delegation of authority to an unconstitutional level. 
If the Court upholds ISPFS' s actions with regard to breath testing "standards" in this state, 
then the Court can only assume that ISPFS will continue to dumb down the standards until there 
is just a single page SOP that says "What ISPFS say goes. Trust us, we're the police." 
Mr. Besaw has tried to point out the flawed system used by ISPFS with regard to breath 
testing in the State of Idaho. The e-mails that are found in Mr. Besaw's record show how ISPFS 
develop its "standards" for breath testing. These standards are not compliant with forensic 
SCIence. 
There was a recently published book by the Committee on IdentifYing the Needs of the 
Forensic Sciences Community, National Research Council. Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: A Path Forward (2009). This book was generated as a result of Congress directing 
the National Academy of Sciences to undertake a study regarding forensic science. Preface at p. 
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XIX. The book discusses: the fundamentals of scientific method as applies to forensic practice; 
falsifiability and replication and peer review of scientific pUblications; the assessment offorensic 
methods and technology; the collection and analysis of forensic data; and accuracy and error rates 
of forensic analysis. The report for Congress noted the lack of standards. There was no 
uniformity in certification of forensic practitioners or the accreditation of crime laboratories. At 
p. 6. The study by the Congressional Committee determined the need for requirements for 
measurement of error such as would be found in breath testing, noting that there are inherent 
limitation of the measurement technique. A range of factors are present and can affect the 
accuracy oflaboratory analysis. Such factors may include deficiencies in the reference materials 
used in the analysis, equipment errors, environmental conditions that lay outside the range which 
the method was validated, sample mix ups and contamination, transcription errors and more. 
The report noted that with regard to breath testing that there has to be a confidence interval 
for the range of breath testing that would supply a high probability of containing the true alcohol 
level. At p. 117. 
The report also criticizes forensic science laboratories that are administered by law 
enforcement agencies. The report notes the forensic laboratories should be independent or 
autonomous from law enforcement agencies. At pp. 183 - 184. 
There is a specific notation regarding standards for quality control: "Standards provide 
the foundation against which performance, reliability, and validity can be accessed. Adherence 
to standards reduces biases, and proves consistency, and enhances the validity and reliability of 
results. Standards reduce variability resulting from idiosyncratic tendencies of the individual 
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examiner." At p. 201. 
The report also notes that there are many scientific organizations that have set standards. 
It cites to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). No where in this report to 
Congress is there any indication that standards are set by way of "wiggle room", "vagueness", and 
discretionary standards. 
In this case, ISPFS violated the mandate of the statutory provision ofI.C. § 18-8004(4). 
The ISPFS did not have the authority to enter into a wholesale change of breath standards from 
mandatory to discretionary. The procedure used was improper, it was not based on scientific 
standards. The SOP was based on what ISPFS gleaned would help in DUI cases and ALS 
administrative hearings. The State's brief agrees. State's Brief at p. 6. 
Please note that the Idaho Supreme Court has determined an action is capricious if it was 
done without a rational basis. In American Law Association of Idaho/Nevada v. State, 142 Id. 
544, 130 P.3d 1082 (2006), the Court found it was arbitrary if the agency action was done in 
disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles. 
What was the rational basis for making the SOP a discretionary document? There was a disregard 
of scientific principles, facts and circumstances making the current SOP arbitrary. 
The e-mails noted in this case make it clear that ISPFS failed to comply with the mandate 
of I.e. § 18-8004(4). A substantial right of Mr. Besaw has been prejudiced, his ability to earn a 
living by way of his CDL driver's license. Of course, Mr. Besaw's case has a wider application 
to all drivers since the breath testing system is being challenged. 
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CONCLUSION 
The breath test results should have been suppressed. The field sobriety test should have 
been suppressed. This Court is requested to direct the magistrate court on remand to suppress the 
breath tests and field sobriety tests. 
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EXHIBIT A 
718 P.2d 171 
149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171,60 A.L.RAth 1103 
(Cite as: 149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171) 
p 
Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. 
The STATE of Arizona, Petitioner, 
v. 
The SlJPERIOR COTJRT of the State of Arizona, 
In and For the COUNTY OF COCHISE, and the 
Hon. James L. Riley, Division III, Respondent, 
and 
Frederick Andrew BLAKE, Real Party in Interest. 
No. 18343-PR. 
April 7,1986. 
A special action was instituted by the State to 
review an order of the respondent court dismissing 
a DWI prosecution on ground that sobriety test 
known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN, test 
was insufficiently reliable to be considered in de-
termining probable cause to arrest. The Court of 
Appeals, 89 vacated dis-
missal of prosecution and remanded, and defendant 
sought review. The Supreme Court, Feldman. 1.. 
held that: (1) HGN test was shown to be suffi-
ciently reliable to be used in establishing probable 
cause for arrest, and (2) HGN test satisfied Frye 
test for admissibility of scientific evidence and was 
admissible for limited purpose of corroborating 
chemical sobriety tests. 
Opinion affirmed as modified, dismissal va-
cated and case remanded. 
West Headnotes 
Criminal Law 110 €:::=388.1 
J 0 Criminal Law 
lOXVn Evidence 
Competency in General 
lOk38R Experiments and Tests; Scientif-
ic and Survey Evidence 
Ok388. k. In general. [\10st 
(Foill1erly 35k63.5(1» 
Page 1 
Evidence helping to give reasonable suspicion 
justifYing limited Terry stop is not required to pass 
Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence. 
ConstAmend.4. 




Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
In general. 
(Formerly 48Ak349(2), 48Ak349) 
Weaving of automobile in traffic lane was a 
specific and articulable fact which justified invest-
igative stop of automobile. 
Automobiles 48A €:=>414 
48A Automobiles 
Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
48Ak4 k. Right to take sample or conduct 
test; initiating procedure. 
(Formerly 48Ak349) 
Officer stopping motorist on suspicion that mo-
torist is driving while intoxicated is entitled to con-
duct standard and reasonable tests to discover 
whether motorist is in fact intoxicated if nothing in 
initial stages of stop serves to dispel officer's suspi-
cions. 4. 
Automobiles 48A €:=>349(6) 
) Prosecution 




© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(Formerly 48Ak349) 
Stopping automobile and administering stand-
ard and reasonable tests to discover whether motor-
ist is intoxicated is more analogous to a limited 
Terry stop than to formal arrest; refusing to follow 
Carlson. 677 .2d 10 
ConsLAmend.4. 
Automobiles 48A ~349(17) 
Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest. Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. )V10S1 
(Formerly 48Ak349) 
Roadside sobriety tests that do not involve long 
delay or unreasonable intrusion may be justified by 
officer's reasonable suspicion, based on specific 
and articulable facts, that driver is intoxicated. 
! ' v 
Automobiles 48A ~419 
Automobiles 
Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
Grounds for Test 
k. Grounds or cause; necessity 
for arrest. 
(Formerly 48Ak349) 
Motorist's erratic driving, appearance and smell 
of alcohol were specific and articulable facts giving 
arresting officer sufficient grounds to administer 
roadside sobriety tests. 
Arrest 35 ~63.4(18) 
Arrest 
35I1 On Criminal Charges 
Officers and Assistants, Arrest 
Without Warrant 
.4 Probable or Reasonable Cause 
Page 2 
k. Evidence. 
Evidence helping to establish probable cause to 
arrest is not required to pass Frye test for admissib-
ility of scientific evidence. 
Automobiles 48A ~422.1 
48A Automobiles 
Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
48Ak422 Conduct and Proof of Test; Found-
ation or Predicate 
J k. In general. 
(Formerly 48Ak422, 48Ak349) 
Evidence established that "horizontal gaze nys-
tagmus test" administered by trained officer was 
sufficiently trustworthy to be used to help establish 
probable cause to arrest for driving while intoxic-
ated. AR.S. § 28-692; 
Automobiles 48A ~349(6) 
) Prosecution 




Defendant's erratic driving, fair perfonnance on 
traditional sobriety tests, smell of alcohol on his 
breath, his appearance and his score on the hori-
zontal gaze nystagmus test were sufficient to estab-
lish probable cause to arrest defendant for driving 
under the influence. A.R.S. § 28-692. 
Automobiles 48A ~41l 
Automobiles 
Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
48Ak41 k. In general. 
(Formerly IIOk388) 
Appropriate disciplines to consider in determ-
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ining whether horizontal gaze nystagmus test for in-
toxication meets general acceptance requirement of 
Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence in-
clude behavioral psychology, highway safety and, 
to a lesser extent, neurology and criminalistics. 
Criminal Law 110 €=388.1 
o Criminal Law 
Evidence 
Competency in General 
Ok388 Experiments and Tests; Scientif-
ic and Survey Evidence 
lOk381l. k. In general. 
(Formerly 110k388(l), 110k388) 
General acceptance requirement of Frye test 
for admissibility of scientific evidence does not ne-
cessitate showing of universal acceptance of the re-
liability of scientific principle or procedure under 
scrutiny. 
Automobiles 48A €=411 
48A Automobiles 
48A1X Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
1 ] k. In general. 
(Formerly 11 Ok388) 
"Horizontal gaze nystagmus test" for intoxica-
tion satisfies Frye standard for admissibility of sci-
entific evidence. 
Automobiles 48A €=422.1 
Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
on,n'kk Conduct and Proof of Test: Found-
ation or Predicate 
48Ak4221 k. In general. 
(Formerly 48Ak422, 110k388) 
Testimony describing results of horizontal gaze 
nystagmus, or HGN, test administered to defendant 
is admissible on issue of defendant's blood alcohol 
level if proper foundation as to techniques used and 
testing officer's ability to use techniques is laid; 
Page 3 
evidence of HGN test, however, is not admissible 
to prove requisite blood alcohol level in absence of 
a laboratory chemical analysis of blood, breath or 
urine. A.R.S. § 28-692. 
J Automobiles 48A €=355(6) 
Prosecution 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evid-
ence 
k. Driving while intoxic-
ated. Mo~.l 
Regardless of quality and abundance of other 
evidence, driver may not be convicted of driving 
under the influence without chemical analysis of 
blood, breath or urine showing proscribed blood al-
cohol content. A.R.S. § 28-692, subd. B. 
Automobiles 48A €=353(6) 
Presumptions and Burden of 
Proof 
k. Driving while intoxic-
ated. 
(Formerly 48Ak353) 
Statutory presumption that driver having blood 
alcohol of 0.10 percent or more by weight is pre-
sumed to be under influence of intoxicating liquor 
must rest on chemical analysis of defendant's blood, 
urine, breath or other bodily substance and may not 
rest on blood alcohol level estimate derived from 
horizontal gaze nystagmus test. A.R.S. § 28-692, 
subd. E. 
Automobiles 48A €=411 
48/\ Automobiles 
Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
1 k. In general. 
(Formerly IIOk388) 
Results of horizontal gaze nystagmus test are 
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admissible only to corroborate challenged accuracy 
of results of chemical tests for blood alcohol level 
and are not admissible in any criminal case as dir-
ect independent evidence to quantify blood alcohol 
content. AR.S. § 28-692. 
**172 *270 Alan K. Polley, Cochise Co. Atty. by 
Dennis L. Lusk, Deputy Co. Atty., Bisbee, for peti-
tioner. 
Robert F. Arentz, Cochise Co. Public Defender, 
Bisbee, for real party in interest. 
Pima Co. Public Defender by Carla G. Ryan, Asst. 
Public Defender, Tucson, Thomas E. Collins, Mari-
copa Co. Atty. by Thomas E. Collins, Maricopa Co. 
Atty., and Patrick Sullivan, Deputy Co. Atty., 
Phoenix, Frederick S. Dean, Tucson City Atty. by 
Frederick S. Dean, Tucson City Atty., and R. Willi-
am Call and Elisabeth C. Sotelo, Asst. City Attys., 
Tucson, Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by Robert K. 
Corbin, Atty. Gen., and Samuel Ruiz, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Phoenix, Steven D. Neely, Pima Co. Atty. by 
Steven D. Neely, Pima County Atty., and John R. 
Gustafson and Sandra M. Hansen, Deputy Co. At-
tys., Tucson, for amicus curiae. 
1. whether the horizontal gaze nystagmus test 
is sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause 
for arrest for DUI, and 
**173 *271 2. whether horizontal gaze nystag-
mus test results are sufficiently reliable to be intro-
Page 4 
duced in evidence at trial. 
FACTS 
In the early morning hours of March 18, 1985, 
Frederick Blake was driving a car on State Route 
92, south of Sierra Vista. He was stopped by Of-
ficer Hohn who had observed the vehicle meander-
ing within its lane, and who therefore suspected 
Blake of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Noting, also, that Blake's appearance and breath in-
dicated intoxication, the officer had Blake perform 
a battery of six field sobriety tests, including the 
horizontal gaze (HGN) test. 
is an involuntary jerking of the eyeball. The jerking 
may be aggravated by central nervous system de-
pressants such as alcohol or barbiturates. See THE 
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THER-
APY 1980 (14th ed. 1982). Horizontal gaze 
is the inability of the eyes to maintain visual 
fixation as they are turned to the side. 
In the HGN test the driver is asked to cover one 
eye and focus the other on an object (usually a pen) 
held by the officer at the driver's eye level. As the 
officer moves the object gradually out of the 
driver's field of vision toward his ear, he watches 
the driver's eyeball to detect involuntary jerking. 
The test is repeated with the other eye. By ob-
serving (1) the inability of each eye to track move-
ment smoothly, (2) pronounced 
imum deviation and (3) onset of the at 
an angle less than 45 degrees in relation to the cen-
ter point, the officer can estimate whether the 
driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) exceeds the 
legal limit of .10 percent. Officer Hohn had been 
trained in the use of the HGN test and certified to 
administer it by the Arizona Law Enforcement Of-
ficer Advisory Council (ALEOC) pursuant to 
4] 
Blake's performance of the first three standard 
field sobriety tests was "fair" and did not amount to 
probable cause to arrest Blake for DUI. As a result 
of the HGN test, however, the officer estimated that 
Blake had a BAC in excess of 10 percent. Blake's 
performance on the last two tests strengthened his 
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conclusion. Having also smelled a strong odor of 
alcohol on Blake's breath and noticed Blake's 
slurred speech and bloodshot, watery and dilated 
eyes, Officer Hohn then arrested Blake on a charge 
of felony DUI in violation of A.R.S. § 28-692. 
Hohn then transported Blake to the police station 
where he administered an intoxilyzer test which 
showed that Blake had a BAC of .163 percent. 
Blake made two motions to the trial court: to 
dismiss the prosecution for lack of probable cause 
to arrest and to preclude the admission of testimony 
of the HGN test and its results at trial. At the evid-
entiary hearing on these two motions the state 
presented evidence regarding the principles and use 
of HGN testing from Dr. Marcelline Bums, a re-
search psychologist who studies the effect of alco-
hol on behavior, Sgt. Richard Studdard of the Los 
Angeles Police Department, and Sgt. Jeffrey 
Raynor and Officer Robert Hohn of the Arizona 
Department of Public Safety. 
Dr. Bums, Director the Southern California Re-
search Institute (SCRI or Institute) testified that the 
Institute had received research contracts from the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) to develop the best possible field sobriety 
tests. The result of this research was a three-test 
battery, which included the walk and tum, the one-
leg stand, and the HGN. This battery could be ad-
ministered without special equipment. required no 
more than five minutes in most cases, and resulted 
in 83 percent accuracy in determining BAC above 
and below .10 percent. Dr. Bums testified that all 
field sobriety tests help the police officers to estim-
ate BAC: The HGN test is based on the known 
principle that certain toxic substances, including al-
cohol, cause The SCRI study found 
HGN to be the best single index of intoxication, be-
cause it is an involuntary response. BAC can even 
be estimated from the angle of onset of the involun-
tary jerking: 50 degrees**174 *272 minus the angle 
of the gaze at the onset of eye oscillation equals the 
BAC: Dr. Bums testified that the HGN test had 
been accepted as valid by the highway safety field, 
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including the ~lITSA, Finnish researchers, state 
agencies such as the California Highway Patrol, 
Arizona Highway Patrol, Washington State Police, 
and numerous city agencies. Finally, the state 
offered in evidence an HGN training manual de-
veloped by the NHTSA for its nationwide program 
to train law enforcement officers. Both the manual 
and training program were based on the Institute's 
studies. 
1. Thus, nystagmus at 45° corresponds 
to a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 
0.05%: nystagmus at 40° to a BAC of 
0.10%; nystagmus at 35° to a BAC of 
0.15%; and nystagmus at 30° > » to a 
BAC of 0.20%. See 1 R. ERWIN. DE-
FENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES 
(3d ed. 1985) ~ 8.l5A[1]. At BACs above 
0.20%, a person's eyes may not be able to 
follow a moving object. Tharp, Gaze Nys-
tagmus As A Roadside Sobriety Test 6 
(unpublished paper available through 
SCRI). It should be noted however that 
when officers administer the test they do 
not necessarily measure the angle of onset: 
instead they look for three characteristics 
of high BAC: inability of smooth pursuit, 
distinct jerkiness at maximum deviation 
and onset of jerkiness prior to 45° > ». 
We do not address the admissibility of 
quantified BAC estimates based on angle 
of onset of nystagmus. 
Sgt. Studdard is currently a supervlsor 111 
charge of DDI enforcement for the City of Los 
Angeles and a consultant to NHTSA on field sobri-
ety testing. Based on his field work administering 
the HGN test and his participation in double blind 
studies at the Institute, he testified that the accuracy 
rate of the HGN test in estimating whether the level 
of BAC exceeds .10 percent is between 80 and 90 
percent. According to Studdard the margin of inac-
curacy is caused by the fact that certain drugs, such 
as barbiturates, cause the same effects as alcohol. 
\Ve take notice, however, that nystagmus may also 
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indicate a number of neurological conditions, and 
the presence of any of these would also affect the 
accuracy of the HGN-based estimate of blood alco-
hol content. See infra at 177. Both Sgt. Studdard 
and Sgt. Raynor, who currently administers the 
HGN training program for the State of Arizona, 
testified that the HGN test is especially useful in 
detecting violations where a driver with BAC over 
.10 percent is able to pull himself together suffi-
ciently to pass the traditional field sobriety tests 
and thus avoid arrest and subsequent chemical test-
ing. 
Sgt. Raynor testified that the traditional field 
sobriety tests are not sensitive enough to detect 
dangerously impaired drivers with BAC between 
.10 percent and .14 percent and that the police of-
ficers thus must permit them to drive on. Sgt. 
Raynor also testified as to the rigor and require-
ments of the Arizona training and certification pro-
gram. 
It is claimed that three times as many 
drivers on the road have BACs in the .10% 
to .14% range than in the .15% to .19% 
range, but those arrested are in the latter 
group, 2 to I. Anderson, Schweitz & 
Snyder, Field Evaluation o[ a Behavioral 
Test Battery jor DWI, U.S. Department of 
Transportation Rep. No. DOT 
HS-806-475 (1983) (included in state's 
evidence). 
At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court concluded that HGN represented a new sci-
entific principle and was therefore subject to the 
Flye standard of admissibility. 
Stafes. Fed. 101 The court 
ruled the HGN test did not satisfy Flye, was there-
fore unreliable, and could not form the basis of 
probable cause. The court granted Blake's motion to 
dismiss. 
The state filed a petition for special action F~ c 
III the court of appeals, which accepted jurisdiction 
and granted relief. The court of appeals noted that 
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the Frye standard applies only to the admissibility 
of evidence at trial, not to probable cause for arrest. 
It stated that probable cause requires only reason-
ably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a 
reasonable person to believe that an offense has 
been committed and that the person to be arrested 
committed the offense. 149 Ariz. at 271, 718 P .2d 
at 173. The court of appeals found HGN suffi-
ciently reliable to **175 *273 provide probable 
cause. ld 149 Ariz. at 273, 718 P.2d at 175. The 
court of appeals held that the HGN test satisfied 
Flye and would be admissible, except that there 
was insufficient foundation as to the arresting of-
ficer's proficiency in administering the test. ld The 
court vacated the trial court's order and remanded 
for further proceedings. 
In Arizona, relief formerly obtained 
by writs of mandamus or prohibition is 
now obtained by "Special Action". See 
DISCUSSION 
I. Was Blake's Arrest Legal? 
Blake contends that the trial court correctly dis-
missed the prosecution after ruling that the HGN 
test did not meet the Flye standard. Because prob-
able cause was established by "an unreliable test. 
the HGN, which has not had its trustworthiness cor-
roborated," the arrest was illegal. and later dis-
covered evidence, such as the intoxilyzer results, 
cannot be used in evidence. 
The Pima County Public Defender, appearing 
amicus, argues that any roadside sobriety test is a 
full search and must, therefore, be founded on prob-
able cause. Because the arresting officer testified 
that he did not have probable cause to arrest even 
after the performance of the traditional field tests, 
amicus argues that he did not have the requisite 
probable cause to administer the HGN test. For this 
cont~ntion amicus relies on l' Carlson 
.2d O. 1984 in which the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that "roadside sobriety testing 
constitutes a full 'search' in the constitutional sense 
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of that tenn and therefore must be supported by 
probable cause." 
] For the reasons set forth below we agree 
with both of the state's arguments. First, administra-
tion of roadside, perfonnance-based sobriety tests 
does not require probable cause. Second, neither 
evidence that fonns the basis for probable cause nor 
that required to raise a reasonable suspicion need be 
tested under the Frye rule. 
Did the Stop Followed by Field Sobriety Tests Viol-
ate the Fourth Amendment? 
The fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees the right to be secure 
against umeasonable search and seizure. This guar-
antee requires arrests to be based on probable cause 
and pennits limited investigatory stops based only 
on an articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal 
} gg 
gg9 Such stops are pennitted al-
though they constitute seizures under the fourth 
amendment. See 
1)83. Officer Hohn testi-
fied that he stopped Blake because Blake's car had 
been weaving in its lane, and he suspected the 
driver to be under the influence of alcohol. We find 
that Blake's weaving was a specific and articulable 
fact which justified an investigative stop. The next 
question is whether this reasonable suspicion also 
justified compelling Blake to perfonn roadside 
sobriety tests. 
An investigatory stop may include a safety 
frisk for weapons as well as questions to dispel the 
officer's reasonable suspicions. 
gg gf\o. While all this may be done 
without the probable cause required for arrest, an 
arrest may occur before the moment the police of-
ficer either accuses the suspect of a specific offense 
or fonnally takes him into custody. It may be 
deemed to have occurred substantially before that 
time, perhaps during questioning. See Stafe 1 
('gar 440" 579. 586 ( 
In this case we confront the difficult area 
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between the physical stop of defendant and the ar-
ticulation of the charge. We must draw the line, 
however fine, between investigatory questioning 
that is pennissible before the arrest and acts per-
missible only after the charges have been made. See 
59 487. 
688. 697 1984) (at scene of fatal car ac-
cident, field sobriety tests were investigatory). In a 
sense this is a **176 *274 question of first impres-
sion. Our cases in the past have presumed that road-
side sobriety tests are incident to the stop, and that 
chemical tests, such as the intoxilyzer, are incident 
to the 
680 
Any examination of a person with a view to 
discovering evidence of guilt to be used in a pro-
secution of a criminal action is a search. The fourth 
amendment does not prohibit all warrantless 
searches, only those that are umeasonable. State 
1. 
( J 
pem1its a warrantless search supported only by 
reasonable suspicion depends on the nature of both 
the governmental interest and the intrusion into a 
citizen's personal security. State v. Grijalva, supra. 
Thus, the necessity of the search is balanced against 
the invasion of the privacy of the citizen that the 
search entails. Jd 
We have held that the state has a compelling 
interest m removing drunk drivers from the high-
The legislature has recog-
nized the threat of drunk drivers and enacted A.R.S. 
~ 28~692(B), which makes it per se illegal to drive 
with a BAC of .10 percent or more, a level at which 
virtually everyone's driving ability is impaired. Jd. 
Against this compelling state interest we are to 
weigh the substantiality of the intrusion or incon-
venience of roadside sobriety tests that measure 
physical perfonnance of the suspected drunk driver. 
In Terry the Supreme Court stated: 
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We merely hold today that where a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reas-
onably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot and that persons 
with whom he is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous, where in the course of in-
vestigating this behavior he identifies himself as 
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and 
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter 
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or 
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of 
himself and others in the area to conduct a care-
fully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which 
might be used to assault him. 
We think Terry is on point: the threat to 
public safety posed by a person driving under the 
influence of alcohol is as great as the threat posed 
by a person illegally concealing a gun. If nothing in 
the initial stages of the stop serves to dispel the 
highway patrol officer's reasonable suspicion. fear 
for the safety of others on the highway entitles him 
to conduct a "carefully limited search" by ob-
serving the driver's conduct and performance of 
standard, reasonable tests to discover whether the 
driver is drunk. The battery of roadside sobriety 
tests is such a limited search. The duration and at-
mosphere of the usual traffic stop make it more 
analogous to a so-called Teny stop than to a formal 
arrest. See 
re-
fuse to adopt the rule of People v. 
We hold, therefore, that roadside sobri-
ety tests that do not involve long delay or unreason-
able intrusion, although searches under the fourth 
amendment, may be justified by an officer's reason-
able suspicion (based on specific, articulable facts) 
that the driver is intoxicated. We further find that 
Blake's erratic driving, appearance and smell of al-
cohol were specific, articulable facts which gave 
the officer sufficient grounds to administer roadside 
sobriety tests, including HGN. 
Page 8 
Is the HGN Test Sufficiently Reliable to Establish 
Probable Cause for Arrest? 
Observing Blake's performance of the tests, the 
officer put him under arrest and took him to the sta-
tion for chemical testing **177 *275 for BAC. 
Blake argues the arrest was invalid for lack of prob-
able cause and that the information obtained by 
later chemical testing is therefore inadmissible. 
Probable cause may not rest on mere suspi-
cion but neither must it rest on evidence sufficient 
to convict. 
In dealing with probable cause ... we deal with 
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday 
life on which reasonable [people], not legal tech-
nieians, act. 
Inform-
ation sufficient to raise a suspicion of criminal be-
havior by definition need not pass tests of admissib-
ility under our rules of evidence. It has long been 
the rule that an arresting officer has probable cause 
if he has reasonably trustworthy information suffi-
cient to lead a responsible person to believe an of-
fense has been committed and that the person to be 
arrested committed it. See 69 
1 1 
( 1 now must determine 
whether the HGN test provides reasonably trust-
worthy information. sufficient to lead a reasonable 
person to believe a driver is intoxicated. 
Nystagmus is a well known physiological phe-
nomenon, defined and described in such tomes as 
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
(1980), DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1974), 7 ENCYCLOPAE-
DIA BRITAN'NICA. MICROPAEDIA (15th ed. 
1974) and STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY (5th Lawyer's ed. 1982). That it can be caused 
by ingestion of alcohol is also accepted in medical 
literature. 
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Jerk ... is characterized by a slow 
drift, usually away from the direction of gaze, 
followed by a quick jerk of recovery in the direc-
tion of gaze. A motor disorder, it may be congen-
ital or due to a variety of conditions affecting the 
brain, including ingestion of drugs such as alco-
hol and barbiturates, palsy of lateral or vertical 
gaze, disorders the vestibular apparatus and 
brainstem and cerebellar 
THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS 
AND THERAPY 1980 (14th ed. 1982) (emphasis 
added). Even before the Institute's federal grant, the 
relationship between BAC and nystagmus was re-
cognized by some highway safety agencies as a tool 
to detect those illegally driving under the influence 
of alcohol. Burns & Moskowitz, Psychophysical 
Tests for DWJ Arrest, U.S. Department of Trans-
portation Rep. No. DOT -HS-802-424 (1977), at 
80. In its federally funded study, the Institute dis-
covered that of the six most sensitive field sobriety 
tests being used by the police around the country, 
the HGN was the most reliable and precise indicat-
or of the proscribed level ofBAC. Jd. at 39. 
Judicial assessment of whether the arresting of-
ficer had probable cause need not rest, however, on 
whether the information relied on is universally 
known. The arresting officer is entitled to draw spe-
cific reasonable inferences from the facts in light of 
his own experience, as well as the transmitted ex-
perience of other police officers. See Terry v Ohio, 
supra, STate 
)097 ( 
Hohn's experience included training in DUI detec-
tion and field administrations of the HGN test. His 
administration of the test did not cause him to arrest 
everyone he tested. He testified that although he 
had logged over 150 field administrations of the 
test battery, he had made only six DUI arrests. On 
the evening of Blake's arrest Officer Hahn had 
made between eight and twelve DUI stops, had giv-
en the battery to all, but found probable cause to ar-
rest only Blake. 
Testimony also showed that Officer Hohn's 
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personal experience is the result of the transmitted 
experience of countless other trained highway 
safety officers. Dr. Burns testified that in a survey 
of the first 800 officers trained, over 80 percent 
rated HGN as the most sensitive roadside sobriety 
test and found the test battery to have increased 
their accuracy in recognizing the impaired driver. 
Sgt. Studdard, who estimated**178 *276 he had 
administered the HGN test on the street to several 
thousand individuals, had seen only one or two 
people in whom the nystagmus did not correlate to 
the BAC. He testified that he had trained numerous 
agencies in Arizona, Michigan, New York, Arkan-
sas, Louisiana, North Carolina and Maryland in the 
use of HGN. He found that the officers' accuracy 
rate in determining BAC was between 80 and 90 
percent. 
J We conclude that the testimony presen-
ted at the evidentiary hearing regarding the reliabil-
ity of the HGN test establishes that in the hands of 
a trained officer the test is reasonably trustworthy 
and may be used to help establish probable cause to 
arrest. We further find that Blake's driving, his "fair 
performance" on the traditional sobriety tests, the 
smell of alcohol on his breath, his appearance and 
his score on the HGN test could lead a reasonable 
person to believe Blake was driving with a BAC in 
excess of .J 0 percent in violation of A.R.S. § 
28-692. Taken together there was more than suffi-
evidence to establish probable 
admissibility under Frye was a prerequisite for 
evidence used to establish probable cause, we va-
cate the trial court's order of dismissal of the case 
and remand the matter for trial. 
2. Are HGN Test Results Admissible Evidence? 
Our holding that when administered by prop-
erly trained and certified police officers the HGN 
test is sufficiently reliable to be used to establish 
probable cause does not mean the test results may 
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be admitted in evidence on the question of guilt or 
innocence. In Fuenning v. Superior Court, supra, 
we held that if a defendant challenges the intoxilyz-
er test results, the conduct that provided probable 
cause becomes relevant to the question of the ac-
curacy of the chemical analysis which allegedly 
showed that the driver's BAC exceeded .10 percent, 
and thus may be admissible. We stated such ad-
missible testimony might include "the manner in 
which he was driving [and] the manner in which he 
perfonned the field sobriety tests .... " at 
599.680 P at 30. 
Unless the results of the HGN test are also ad-
missible under our rules of evidence, when a driver 
challenges the chemical test results, the state may 
find itself in the position of being able to support 
the arrest with the results of the traditional field 
sobriety tests, but not the more probative HGN test 
results. This result is not unique. 
Much evidence of real and substantial probative 
value goes out on considerations irrelevant to its 
probative weight but relevant to possible misun-
derstanding or misuse by the jury. 
()nifcd 69 
The "Frye Rule n 
The HGN test is a different type of test from 
balancing on one leg or walking a straight line be-
cause it rests almost entirely upon an assertion of 
scientific legitimacy rather than a basis of common 
knowledge. Different rules therefore apply to de-
tennine its admissibility. See 
to this question 
admissibility that we now address ourselves. 
Rules of evidence are aimed at preventing jury 
confusion, prejudice and undue consumption of 
time and trial resources. Slate 1". 86 
(1 J); 403. 
Scientific evidence is a source of particular 
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judicial caution. Because "science" is often accep-
ted in our society as synonymous with truth, there 
is a substantial risk that the jury may give undue 
weight to such evidence. M. UDALL & 1. LIVER-
MORE, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 102 (2d ed. 1982). 
If a technique has an "enonnous effect in resolving 
completely a matter in controversy," **179 *277 it 
must be demonstrably reliable before it is admiss-
ible. Id. 
Before expert opinion evidence based on a nov-
el scientific principle can be admitted, the rule of 
Flye v. United States, supra, requires that the the-
ory relied on be in confonnity with a generally ac-
cepted explanatory theory. See 
P.2d The purpose of this require-
ment is to assure the reliability of the testimony. 
Because HGN is a new technique based upon sci-
entific principles, its reliability is to be measured 
against the Frye standard. Id. Frye screens out un-
reliable scientific evidence because under its stand-
ard 
it is not enough that a qualified expert, or even 
several experts, testify that a particular scientific 
technique is valid; Frye imposes a special bur-
den-the technique must be generally accepted 
bv the relevant scientific community. 
Symposium 011 Science and Rules of Evidence, 
99 F.R.D. 187, 189 (1984) (emphasis in original). 
Recognizing that judges and juries are not always 
in a position to assess the validity of the claims 
made by an expert witness before making findings 
of fact, Frye guarantees that reliability will be as-
sessed by those in the best position to do so: mem-
bers of the relevant scientific field who can dispas-
sionately study and test the new theory. 
If the scientific principle has gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs, 
evidence resulting from its application is admiss-
ible, "subject to a foundational showing that the ex-
pert was qualified, the technique was properly used, 
and the results were accurately recorded." 
To determine 
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whether the HGN test satisfies the test of general 
acceptance we must (1) identify the appropriate sci-
entific community whose acceptance of the nystag-
mus principles and validity of the HGN test is re-
quired, and (2) determine whether there is general 
acceptance of both the scientific principle and the 
technique applying the theory. See Symposium, 99 
F.R.D. at 193; M. UDALL & 1. LIVERJv1ORE, 
supra. The admissibility of HGN test results under 
the Frye standard is an issue of first impression. 
Our search has not brought to light any reported 
American case law ruling on the issue. 
FN4. We have discovered two cases that 
discuss the admissibility of nystagmus on 
the question of BAC. 
State v. Nagel, Ohio 
Ct.App. No. 2100, filed Feb. 5, 1986. In 
Loomis the superior court held the muni-
cipal court had erred in allowing the of-
ficer to testify as to his opinion based on 
training, experience and the number of 
times he had given the test. The court in 
dictum then stated that it would also have 
been error to admit the officer's testimony 
as an expert opinion because the state had 
failed to demonstrate that the nystagmus 
test was reliable by showing it had gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs, as required by Frye. In 
Nagel, the court of appeals affirmed the 
trial court's admission of testimony on 
HGN. Rejecting appellant's argument that 
it was inadmissible because the testifying 
officer was not an expert and there was no 
scientific basis for the HGN test, the court 
held nystagmus is objectively observable 
and requires no expert interpretation. 
The state argues that the relevant scientific 
community is that of law enforcement and highway 
safety agencies and behavioral psychologists. Pub-
lic defender amicus contends that we should disreg-
ard these sources and argues that the HGN phe-
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nomenon requires assessment by scientists in the 
fields of neurology, ophthalmology, pharmacology 
and criminalistics. It claims that narrowing the field 
deprives the general scientific community of the 
time needed to evaluate the procedure before it is 
examined by the legal community. We agree that 
validation studies must be performed by scientists 
other than those who have professional and person-
al interest in the outcome of the evaluation. 
1 99. 
We believe, however, that the relevant scientif-
ic community that must be shown to have accepted 
a new scientific procedure is often self-selecting. 
Scientists who have no interest in a new scientific 
principle are unlikely to evaluate it, even if a court 
determines they are part of a relevant scientific 
community. The HGN test measures **180 *278 a 
behavioral phenomenon: specifically the effects of 
alcohol on one aspect of human behavior, the 
movement of the eye. Thus, it stands to reason that 
experimental psychologists in the area of behavior-
al psychology would be interested in verifying the 
validity of the HGN test and should be included in 
the relevant scientific community. Similarly, the 
problem of alcohol's effect on driving ability is a 
major concern to scientists in the area of highway 
safety and they, too, should be included. 
We disagree with the defendant's implication 
that those in the field of highway safety or law en-
forcement are necessarily biased. We believe the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's 
interest in funding research to identify the drunk 
driver is not subject to question in this instance. 
The NHTSA was addressing a complex problem: 
every state has either a presumptive or "per se illeg-
al" law that makes reference to BAC (typically .10 
percent). Officers whose task it is to remove violat-
ors of these laws from the roads may, upon initial 
suspicion, administer tests. but until re-
cently the relationship of the tests to specific BAC 
levels was not well documented. The purpose of 
NHTSA's program was to develop a test battery to 
assist officers in discriminating between those 
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drivers who are in violation of these laws and those 
who are not. Furthermore, it is not to the advantage 
of law enforcement in the highway safety field to 
have an unreliable field sobriety test. It is ineffi-
cient to arrest and transport a driver for chemical 
testing, only to find that he is not in violation of the 
law. We believe that the work of highway safety 
professionals and behavioral psychologists who 
study effects of alcohol on behavior is directly af-
fected by the claims and application of the HGN 
test, so that both these groups must be included in 
the relevant scientific community. 
[ OJ We are not forced to come to the same 
conclusion with respect to neurologists, pharmaco-
logists, ophthalmologists and criminalists. Al-
though it is true that the form of that 
concerns us is the result of a neurological malfunc-
tion, we agree with Dr. Bums who testified that 
"the field of neurology does not concern itself spe-
cifically with alcohol effects on performance and 
even more specifically with field sobriety." She did 
state, however, that a "very small segment of the 
neurology community" concerns itself with the ef-
fects and has produced some literature. No argu-
ment has been made why the fields of pharmaco-
logy, ophthalmology and criminalistics (beyond 
those concerned with detecting violators of DUI 
laws) should be included in the relevant scientific 
community and no convincing reason occurs to us. 
We conclude, therefore, that to determine whether 
the HGN test satisfies the Fr)!e requirement of gen-
eral acceptance the appropriate disciplines include 
behavioral psychology, highway safety and. to a 
lesser extent, neurology and criminalistics. 
We now tum to the question of whether there 
has been general acceptance of both the HGN test 
and its underlying principle. The burden of proving 
general acceptance is on the proponent of the new 
technique; it may be proved by expert testimony 
and scientific and legal literature. We have already 
summarized the expert testimony presented by the 
state, supra at 173. In addition, the state submitted 
both scientific publications and reports of research 
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done for the United States Department of Trans-
portation. These are listed in Appendix A. 
At the evidentiary hearing Blake presented no 
evidence to refute either the substance of the expert 
opinion testimony or the contention that it had gen-
eral acceptance. Blake and public defender amicus 
instead argued that there is a paucity of literature 
and that the appropriate scientific disciplines have 
not yet had the opportunity to duplicate and evalu-
ate Dr. Bums' work. 
Our own research is listed in Appendix B. The 
literature demonstrates to our satisfaction that those 
professionals who have investigated the subject do 
not dispute the strong correlation between BAC and 
the **181 *279 different types of nystagmus. Cj 
91 894 
(concluding that lie detector tests have not been ac-
corded such recognition). Furthermore, those who 
have investigated the relation between BAC and 
nystagmus as the eye follows a moving object have 
uniformly found that the higher the BAC. the earli-
er the onset of involuntary jerking of the eyeball. 
Although the publications are not voluminous, they 
have been before the relevant communities a con-
siderable period of time for any opposing views to 
have surfaced. See Appendix B. 
[: 1 j Based on all the evidence we conclude 
there has been sufficient scrutiny of the HGN test 
to permit a conclusion as to reliability. The 
"general acceptance" requirement does not neces-
sitate a showing of universal acceptance of the reli-
ability of the scientific principle and procedure. 
1'. 
(unanimity of scientific opinion is not re-
quired); 1. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIF-
IC EVIDENCE 164 (2d ed.1974) ("substantial ma-
jority" is sufficient to show general acceptance). 
Neither must the principle and procedure be abso-
lutely accurate or certain. Stale v Fa/de:. 91 
280. a1898. 
fl 3J We believe that the HGN test satisfies 
the Flye standard. The evidence demonstrates that 
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the following propositions have gained general ac-
ceptance in the relevant scientific community: (1) 
HGN occurs in conjunction with alcohol consump-
tion; (2) its onset and distinctness are correlated to 
BAC; (3) BAC in excess of .10 percent can be es-
timated with reasonable accuracy from the combin-
ation of the eyes' tracking ability, the angle of onset 
of nystagmus and the degree of at max-
imum deviation; and (4) officers can be trained to 
observe these phenomena sufficiently to estimate 
accurately whether BAC is above or below .10 per-
cent. We therefore hold that, with proper founda-
tion as to the techniques used and the officer's abil-
ity to use it (see Collins 
at testimony of defendant's nystagmus is ad-
missible on the issue of a defendant's blood alcohol 
level as would be other field sobriety test results on 
the question of the accuracy of the chemical analys-
IS. 
Our holding does not mean that evidence of 
nystagmus is admissible to prove BAC of .10 per-
cent or more in the absence of a laboratory 
breath or urine. Such a use of 
HGN test results would raise a number of due pro-
cess problems different from those associated with 
the chemical testing of bodily fluids. The arresting 
officer's "reading" of the HGN test cannot be veri-
fied or duplicated by an independent party. See 
1 
( 979). The test's recognized margin of er-
ror provides problems as to criminal convictions 
which require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The circumstances under which the test is 
administered at roadside may affect the reliability 
of the test results. Nystagmus may be caused by 
conditions other than alcohol intoxication. i\l1d fi-
nally, the far more accurate chemical testing 
devices are readily available. 
Our limitation on the use of HGN test results is 
also consistent with Arizona's DUI statute. When 
referring to the tests to be administered to determ-
ine BAC, the statute speaks in terms of taking 
blood, urine and breath samples from the defendant 
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for analysis. See AR.S. § 28-692(H). Clearly, 
BAC under § 12-692 is to be determined deduct-
ively from analysis of bodily fluids, not inductively 
from observation of involuntary bodily movements. 
6J We also hold, therefore, that re-
gardless of the quality and abundance of other evid-
ence, a person may not be convicted of a violation 
of A.R.S. § 28-692(B) without chemical 
breath or urine showing a proscribed blood 
alcohol content pursuant to title 28, article 5 of the 
Arizona revised statutes. Similarly, the presumption 
under A.R.S. § 28- *280 692(E)(3) that a defendant 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor in vi-
olation of subsection (A) must also rest on chemical 
"analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, breath or 
other bodily substance," AR.S. § 28- **182 
692(E), as the statute clearly states, and not on a 
BAC estimate based on nystagmus. Thus, evidence 
of HGN test results is admissible, as is other evid-
ence in subsection (B) cases, only to corroborate 
the challenged accuracy of the chemical test results. 
See 1 
680 JO. It is admissible in subsection (A) 
cases for the same purpose and, also, as evidence 
that the driver is "under the influence." It is not ad-
missible in any criminal case as direct independent 
evidence to quantifY blood alcohol content. 
CONCLUSION 
We find that the horizontal gaze nystagmus test 
properly administered by a trained police officer is 
sufficiently reliable to be a factor in establishing 
probable cause to arrest a driver for violating 
AR.S. § 28-692(B). We further find that the hori-
zontal gaze nystagmus test satisfies the Frye test for 
reliability and may be admitted in evidence to cor-
roborate or attack, but not to quantify, the chemical 
analysis of the accused's blood alcohol content. It 
may not be used to establish the accused's level of 
blood alcohol in the absence of a chemical analysis 
showing the proscribed level in the accused's blood, 
breath or urine. In subsection (A) prosecutions it is 
admissible, as is other evidence of defendant's be-
havior, to prove that he was "under the influence." 
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We approve the court of appeals' opinion, as 
modified, vacate the trial court's dismissal of the 
Blake prosecution for violation of A.R.S. § 
28-692(B), and remand for proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion. 
HOLOHAN, c.J., GORDON, V.CJ .. and HAYS 
and CAMERON, H, concur. 
APPENDIX A 
L Anderson, Schweitz & Snyder, Field Evalu-
ation of a Behavioral Test BattelY for DWI, u.s. 
Dept. of Transportation Rep. No. 
DOT-HS-806--475 (1983) (field evaluation of the 
field sobriety test battery (HGN, one leg stand, and 
walk and tum) conducted by police officers from 
four jurisdictions indicated that battery was approx-
imately 80 percent effective in determining BAC 
above and below .10 percent). 
2. Bums & Moskowitz. Psychophysical Tests 
(or DWI Arrest, U.S. Dept of Transportation Rep. 
No. DOT-HS-802--424 (1977) (recommended the 
three-test battery developed by SCRI (one leg 
stand, walk and tum, and HGN) to aid officers in 
discriminating BAC level). 
3. Compton, Use of the Gaze Nvstagmus Test 
to Screen Drivers at D WI Sobriety Checkpoints, 
U.S. Dept. of Transportation (1984) (field evalu-
ation of HGN test administered to drivers through 
car window in approximately 40 seconds: "the 
test scores identified 95% of the impaired 
drivers" at 2; 15 percent false positive for sober 
drivers, id.). 
4. I R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DR1JNK 
DRIVING CASES (3d ed. 1985) ("A strong correl-
ation exists between the BAC and the angle of on-
set of [gaze] nystagmus." Id at § 8.15A[3] ). 
5. Rashbass, The Relationship Between Saccad-
ic and Smooth Tracking Eye Movements, 159 1. 
PHYSIOL. 326 (1961) (barbiturate drugs interfere 
with smooth tracking eye movement). 
6. Tharp, Bums & Moskowitz, Development 
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and Field Test of Psychophysical Tests for DWI Ar-
rests, U.S. Dept. of Transportation Rep. No. 
DOT-HS-805-864 (1981) (standardized proced-
ures for administering and scoring the SCRI three-
test battery; participating officers able to classify 81 
percent of volunteers above or below .10 percent). 
7. Wilkinson, Kime & Purnell, Alcohol and 
Human Eye Movement, 97 BRAIN 785 (1974) (oral 
dose of ethyl alcohol impaired smooth pursuit eye 
movement of all human subjects). 
*281 APPE]\''DIX B 
1. Aschan, Different Types o( Alcohol 
140 ACTA OTOLAR'{NGOL SUPP. 69 
(Sweden 1958) ("From a medico-legal viewpoint, 
simultaneous recording of AGN [Alcohol Gaze 
and PAN [positional alcoholic 
should be of value, since it will show in which 
phase the patient's blood alcohol curve is .... "). 
**183 2. Aschan & Bergstedt, Positional Alco-
holic in Man Following Repeated Alco-
hol Doses, 80 ACTA OTOLARYNGOL SUPP. 330 
(Sweden 1975) (abstract available on DIALOG, file 
173 :Embase 1975-79) (degree of intoxication influ-
ences both PAN I and PAN II). 
3. Aschan, Bergstedt, Goldberg & Laurell. Pos-
itional in Man During and After Alcohol 
Intoxication, 17 OJ. OF STUD. ON ALCOHOL. 
Sept. 1956. at 381. Study distinguishing two types 
of alcohol-induced P AN (positional al-
coholic I and PAN II. found intensity of 
PAN I, with onset about one-half hour after alcohol 
ingestion. was proportional to amount of alcohol 
taken. 
4. Baloh, Sharma, Moskowitz & Griffith, Effect 
of Alcohol and Marijuana on Eye Movements, 50 
AVIAT. SPACE ENVIRON. MED .. Jan. 1979, at 
18 (abstract available on DIALOG, file 
153 :Medline 1979-79) (smooth pursuit eye move-
ment effects of alcohol overshadowed those of 
marijuana). 
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5. Barnes, The Effects of Ethyl Alcohol on Visu-
al Pursuit and Suppression of the Vestibulo-Ocular 
Reflex, 406 ACTA OTOLARYNGOL SUPP. 161 
(Sweden 1984) (ethyl alcohol disrupted visual pur-
suit eye movement by increasing number of nystag-
mic "catch-up saccades"). 
6. Church & Williams, Dose- and Time-
Dependenl Effects of Ethanol, 54 
& CLIN. NElJROPHYSIOL., 
Aug. 1982, at 161 (abstract available on DIALOG, 
file 11 :Psychinfo 1967-85 or file 72:Embase 
1982-85) (positional alcohol increased 
with dose levels of ethanol). 
7. Fregly, Bergstedt & GraybieL Relationships 
Between Blood Alcohol, Positional Alcohol 
and Postural Equilibrium, 28 OJ. OF STUD. 
ON ALCOHOL, March 1967, at 1 L 17 (declines 
from baseline performance levels correlated with 
peak PAN I responses and peak blood alcohol levels). 
8. Goldberg, Effects and After-Effects of Alco-
hol, Tranquilizers and Fatigue on Ocular Phenom-
ena, ALCOHOL AND ROAD TRAFFIC 123 
(1963) (of different types of alcohol 
gaze is the most easily observed). 
9. Helzer, Detecting DUIs Through the Use of 
Nystagmus, LAW AND ORDER, Oct. 1984, at 93 
(nystagmus is "a powerful tool for officers to use at 
roadside to determine BAC of stopped drivers ... 
[O]fficers can learn to estimate BACs to within an 
average of 0.02 percent of chemical test readings." 
Jd. at 94). 
10. Lehti, The Effect of Blood Alcohol Concen-
tration on the Onset of Gaze 136 
BLUTALKOHOL 414 (West Germany 1976) 
(abstract available on DIALOG. file 173:Embase 
1975-79) (noted a statistically highly significant 
correlation between BAC and the angle of onset of 
nystagmus with respect to the midpoint of the field 
of vision). 
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11. Mizoi, Hishida & Maeba, Diagnosis of Al-
cohol Intoxication by the Optokinetic Test, 30 QJ. 
OF STlJD. ON ALCOHOL 1 (March-lune 1969) 
(optokinetic ocular adaptation to move-
ment of object before eyes, can also be used to de-
tect central nervous system impairment caused by 
alcohol. Optokinetic nystagmus is inhibited at BAC 
of only .051 percent and can be detected by op-
tokinetic nystagmus test. Before dosage subjects 
could follow a speed of 90 degrees per second; 
after, less than 70 degrees per second). 
12. Murphree, Price & Greenberg, Effect of 
Congeners in Alcoholic Beverages on the Incidence 
of 27 OJ. OF STUD. ON ALCOHOL, 
lune 1966, at 201 (positional 1S a con-
sistent, sensitive indicator of alcohol intoxication). 
13. Nathan, Zare, Ferneau & Lowenstein, Ef~ 
fects of Congener Differences in Alcoholic Bever-
ages on the Behavior of Alcoholics, 5 OJ. OF 
STUD. ON ALCOHOL SUPP., May 1970. at 87 
(abstract available on DIALOG, file 11 :Psycinfo 
1967-85) (incidence of nystagmus and other nys-
tagmoid movements increased with duration of 
drinking). 
14. Norris, The Correlation of Angle of Onset 
of With Blood Alcohol **184 *282 
Level. Report of a Field Trial, CALIF. ASS'N 
CRlMINALISTICS NEWSLETTER, lune 1985, at 
21 (The relationship between the ingestion of alco-
hol and the inset of various kinds of 
"appears to be well documented." Id "While nys-
tagmus appears to be useful as a roadside sobriety 
test, at this time, its use to predict a person's blood 
alcohol level does not appear to be warranted." Jd. 
at 22). 
15. Nuotto, Paiva & Seppala, Ya/oxone Ethan-
ol Interaction in Experimental and Clinical Situ-
ations, 54 ACTA PHARMACOL. TOXICOL. 278 
(1984) (abstract available on DIALOG, file 
5: :Biosis Previews 1981-86) (ethanol alone does-
dependently induced 
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16. Oosterveld, Meineri & Paolucci, Quantitat-
ive Effect of Linear Acceleration on Positional Al-
cohol 45 AEROSPACE MEDICINE. 
July 1974, at 695 (G-Ioading brings about PAN 
even when subject has not ingested alcohol; 
however when subjects ingested alcohol, no PAN 
was found when subjects were in supine position, 
even with G-force at 3). 
17. Penttila, Lehti & Lonnqvist, and 
Disturbances in Psychomotor Functions Induced by 
Psychotropic Drug Therapy, 1974 PSYCHIAT. 
FENN. 315 (abstract available on DIALOG, file 
173:Embase 1975-79) (psychotropic drugs induce 
18. Savolainen, Riihimaki, Vaheri & Linnoila, 
Effects of Xylene and Alcohol on Vestibular and 
Visual Functions in Man, SCAND. J. WORK EN-
VIRON. HEALTH 94 (Sweden 1980) (abstract 
available on DIALOG, file 172:Embase 1980-81 
on file 5:Biosis Previews 1981-86) (the effects of 
alcohol on vestibular functions (e.g. positional 
were dose-dependent). 
19. Seelmeyer, Nystagmus, A Valid DUI Test, 
LAW AND ORDER, July 1985, at 29 (horizontal 
gaze nystagmus test is used in "at least one law en-
forcement agency in each of the 50 states" and is "a 
legitimate method of establishing probable cause." 
Id). 
20. Tharp, Moskowitz & Bums. Circadean Ef~ 
(ects on Alcohol Gaze (paper presented 
at 20th annual meeting of Society for Psycho-
physiological Research), abstract in 18 PSYCHO-
PHYSIOLOGY, March 1981 (highly significant 
correlation between angle of onset of AGN and 
BAC). 
21. Umeda & Sakata, Alcohol and the Oculo-
motor System, 87 ANNALS OF OTOLOGY, 
RHINOLOGY & LARYNGOLOGY, May-June 
1978, at 392 (in volunteers whose "caloric eye 
tracking pattern" (CETP) was normal before alco-
hol intake, influence of alcohol on oculomotor sys-
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tern appeared consistently in the following order: 
(l) abnormality of CETP, (2) positional alcohol 
(3) tracking pattern, 
(4) alcohol gaze 
22. Zyo, Medico-Legal and Psychiatric Studies 
on the Alcoholic Intoxicated Offender, 30 JAP AN-
ESE 1. OF LEGAL MED., No.3, 1976, at 169 
(abstract available on DIALOG, file 21:Nationai 
Criminal Justice Reference Service 1972-85) 
(recommends use of nystagmus test to determine 
somatic and mental symptoms of alcohol intoxica-
tion as well as BAC). 
Ariz.,1986. 
State v. Superior Court In and For Cochise County 
149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171,60 A.L.RAth 1103 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.comiprint/printstream. aspx?mt= \¥ estlaw &prf't= HTMLE&vr=2. O&destination=atp ... 11127/2012 
EXHIBIT B 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services 
CERTIFICATE OF APPROV AL 
The Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) hereby certifies and approves Alcohol 
Simulator Solution Lot Number 10802 (a product manufactured by RepCo Marketing Inc.) to be 
used to conduct perfom1ance verification checks within the State of Idaho in accordance with 
the analytical methods, policies and/or procedures promulgated by the Department governing 
breath alcohol examinations. ISPFS also approves of the manufacturer oftrus solution (RepCo 
Marketing Inc.) to provide Alcohol Simulator Solution Lot Number 10802 in the State of Idaho. 
This lot has a target value of 0.080 with a range of 0.072 to 0.088 grams of ethyl alcohol/210 
liters of vapor. 
The expiration date for this lot number is August 9th , 2012 at 11 :59 PM. 
8 -3/-10 
Date 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai) 
On this 31 st day of August, in the year 2010, before me, JoAnn Hutchison, a notary 
public, personally appeared Jeremy Johnston, known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument as a Forensic Scientist for the Idaho State Police Forensic 
Services, and acknowledge to me that he executed the same as such Scientist. 
~U.l.4..(.44-~t:.&~~~~~_Notary Public 
Commission Expires: /:?-/tS J:71O/~­
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